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Abstract
Control of multi-agent systems via game theory is investigated. Assume a system level object is given, the utility functions for
individual agents are designed to convert a multi-agent system into a potential game. First, for fixed topology, a necessary and
sufficient condition is given to assure the existence of local information based utility functions. Then using local information
the system can converge to a maximum point of the system object, which is a Nash equilibrium. It is also proved that a
networked evolutionary potential game is a special case of this multi-agent system. Second, for time-varying topology, the state
based potential game is utilized to design the optimal control. A strategy based Markov state transition process is proposed
to assure the existence of state based potential function. As an extension of the fixed topology case, a necessary and sufficient
condition for the existence of state depending utility functions using local information is also presented. It is also proved that
using better reply with inertia strategy, the system converges to a maximum strategy of the state based system object, which
is called the recurrent state equilibrium.
Key words: Finite game, (state based) potential function, multi-agent systems, designed utility function, semi-tensor
product of matrices.
1 Introduction
In recent years the game based control has received ex-
tensive attention from control community. The game
theory has been applied to various control problems, in-
cluding control of hybrid systems[18], planning hybrid
power systems and distributed power control [15], [11],
analysis and control of networks [17], distributed cover-
age of mobile agents [20], [21], road congestion control
[19], just to name few.
Particularly, the game theoretic control is a promising
new approach to the distributed control of multi-agent
systems. In [13] the consensus of multi-agent systems
is investigated. [10] describes a solution framework for
multi-agent control problem using game theory. Non-
cooperative dynamic game theory provides an environ-
ment for formulating multi-agent decision control prob-
lems using distributed optimization [2]. Learning is an
important tool to realize a global goal for game theo-
retic approach of multi-agent systems [1]. An hourglass
architecture was proposed in [10] to illustrate the game
⋆ This work is supported partly by NNSF 61333001 and
61273013 of China. Corresponding author: Daizhan Cheng.
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theoretic control using potential games as the interface
(refer to Fig. 1).
Potential Games
Utility Design
Learning Design
Fig. 1. Game Theoretic Approach
Consider a multi-agent system. Assume a system level
objective function is given. This paper considers whether
the system designer is able to design local information
based utility functions for individual agents, such that
the multi-agent system becomes a networked potential
game with the objective function as the potential func-
tion. Then as the agents using their local information to
maximize their utility functions the overall system can
maximize the (system level) objective function. The pa-
per consists mainly of two parts: First, the fixed topol-
ogy case is considered. A necessary and sufficient con-
dition is obtained to assure the existence of local infor-
mation based utility functions. Then we show that the
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networked evolutionary potential games are special case
of this kind of multi-agent systems.
Second, the case of time-varying topology is investi-
gated. The concepts and results about state based po-
tential game proposed by J.R. Marden [14] have been
used and combined with our previous results. Similar to
fixed topology case, a necessary and sufficient condition
is also obtained. Certain state transition process is pro-
posed as strategy depending Markov process, which as-
sures the non-decreasing requirement of the state based
potential function. An illustrative example is presented,
which shows that the game theoretic control makes the
multi-agent system reach consensus with probability 1.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section
2 provides some necessary preliminaries, including (i)
semi-tensor product of matrices, which is a basic tool
in our approach; (ii)the potential equation, which is a
key result used in this paper; (iii) networked potential
game, which is an important example of the multi-agent
systems concerned in this paper. Section 3 considers the
game theoretic control for fixed topology multi-agent
systems. A necessary and sufficient condition is pre-
sented. It is also shown that networked potential games
meet the requirement. The game theoretic control for
time-varying topology is discussed in Section 4. State
based potential game is reviewed first. A necessary and
sufficient conditions is also obtained. An illustrative ex-
ample is presented. Section 5 is a brief conclusion.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Semi-tensor Product of Matrices
This subsection gives a brief review for semi-tensor prod-
uct (STP). We refer to [3], [4], [5] for details. For state-
ment ease, we first introduce some notations:
(1) Mm×n: the set ofm×n dimensional real matrices.
(2) Col(A) (Row(A)): the set of columns (rows) of A;
Coli(A) (Rowi(A)): the i-th column (row) of A.
(3) Dk = {1, 2, · · · , k}, D := D2;
(4) δin: the i-th column of the identity matrix In;
(5) ∆n = {δin | i = 1, 2, · · · , n};
(6) L ∈ Mm×r is a logical matrix, if Col(L) ⊂ ∆m.
The set of m × r logical matrices is denoted as
Lm×r;
(7) Let L be a logical matrix, i.e., L ∈ Lm×r. Then
L = [δi1m δ
i2
m · · · δ
ir
m]. For brevity,
L = δm[i1 i2 · · · ir].
(8) Set of random vectors:
Υk :=
{
(r1, r2, · · · , rk)
T
∣∣ ri ≥ 0, k∑
i=1
ri = 1
}
.
(9) Set of random matrices:
Υm×n :=
{
M ∈ Mm×n
∣∣ Col(M) ⊂ Υm} .
Definition 1 Let A ∈ Mm×n, B ∈ Mp×q, and t =
lcm(n, p) be the least common multiple of n and p. Then
the (left) STP ofA andB, denoted byA⋉B, is defined as
A⋉B :=
(
A⊗ It/n
) (
B ⊗ It/p
)
, (1)
where the ⊗ is the Kronecker product.
Remark 2 (1) If n = p, the STP defined in Definition
1 degenerates to the conventional matrix product.
Hence, STP is a generalization of the conventional
matrix product. Hence, we adopt as the convention
that AB := A⋉B.
(2) All the major properties of conventional matrix
product, such as the associativity and the distribu-
tivity etc., remain available.
The following proposition shows that the STP has cer-
tain communicative property.
Proposition 3 Given A ∈Mm×n.
1. Let Z ∈ Rt be a column vector. Then
ZA = (It ⊗A)Z. (2)
2. Let Z ∈ Rt be a row vector. Then
AZ = Z(It ⊗A). (3)
To explore further communicating properties, we intro-
duce the swap matrix.
Definition 4 A swap matrix W[m,n] ∈ Mmn×mn is
defined as follows:
W[m,n] = δmn[1,m+ 1, · · · , (n− 1)m+ 1;
2,m+ 2, · · · , (n− 1)m+ 2;
· · · ; m, 2m, · · · , nm].
(4)
The following proposition shows that the swap matrix is
orthogonal.
Proposition 5
WT[m,n] =W
−1
[m,n] =W[n,m]. (5)
Its fundamental function is to swap two factors.
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Proposition 6 1. Let X ∈ Rm, Y ∈ Rn be two col-
umn vectors. Then
W[m,n] ⋉X ⋉ Y = Y ⋉X. (6)
2. Let X ∈ Rm, Y ∈ Rn be two row vectors. Then
X ⋉ Y ⋉W[m,n] = Y ⋉X. (7)
2.2 Potential Games
Definition 7 [9] A finite game is denoted by G =
{N,S, c}, where (i) N = {1, · · · , n} is the set of players;
(ii) S =
∏n
i=1 Si is the profile of strategies (or actions)
Si, where Si = {1, · · · , ki} is the set of strategies of
player i; (iii) c = (c1, · · · , cn) and each ci : S → R is the
utility (or payoff) function of player i.
To use STP, the action ai ∈ Si is denoted as Si ={
δ
j
ki
∣∣ j = 1, · · · , ki}, where j ∈ Si is expressed as j ∼
δ
j
ki
. Then each utility function ci can be expressed as
ci = V
c
i ⋉
n
j=1 aj , i = 1, · · · , n, (8)
where V ci ∈ R
k is called the structure vector of ci (k :=∏n
i=1 ki).
The set of finite games with |N | = n, |Si| = ki is denoted
by G[n;k1,··· ,kn]. G ∈ G[n;k1,··· ,kn] is completely deter-
mined by VG := (V
c
1 , · · · , V
c
n ) ∈ R
nk. Hence, G[n;k1,··· ,kn]
has a vector space structure as Rnk [8].
Definition 8 Consider a finite game G = {N,S,C}. G
is a potential game if there exists a function P : S → R,
called the potential function, such that for every i ∈ N
and for every s−i ∈ S−i :=
∏
j 6=i Sj and ∀α, β ∈ Si
ci(α, s−i)− ci(β, s−i) = P (α, s−i)− P (β, s−i). (9)
Potential games have some nice properties, which make
them helpful in control design. We listed some as follows:
Theorem 9 [16] If G is a potential game, then the po-
tential function P is unique up to a constant number.
Precisely, if P1 and P2 are two potential functions of G,
then P1 − P2 = c0 ∈ R.
Theorem 10 [16] Every finite potential game possesses
a pure Nash equilibrium. The myopic best response ad-
justment (MBRA) leads to a Nash equilibrium. (Please
also refer to (18)-(19) for MBRA.)
Consider a finite game G = {N,S, c}, where |N | = n,
|Si| = ki, i = 1, · · · , n, and the payoff function of player
i is denoted as (8). We need some new notations as:
k[p,q] :=
{∏q
j=p kj , q ≥ p
1, q < p;
(10)
and
Ei := Ik[1,i−1] ⊗ 1ki ⊗ Ik[i+1,n] ∈Mk×k/ki , i = 1, · · · , n.
(11)
Then we construct a linear equation, called the potential
equation, as


−E1 E2 0 · · · 0
−E1 0 E3 · · · 0
...
−E1 0 0 · · · En




ξ1
ξ2
...
ξn

 =


(V c2 − V
c
1 )
T
(V c3 − V
c
1 )
T
...
(V cn − V
c
1 )
T

 , (12)
where ξi ∈ Rk/ki . Then we have the following result:
Theorem 11 [6], [8] A finite game G ∈ G[n;k1,··· ,kn] is
a potential game, if and only if the potential equation
(12) has solution. Moreover, if ξ is a solution then the
potential function can be expressed as
P (x1, · · · , xn) = V
P
⋉
n
j=1 xj , (13)
where V P , the structure vector of the potential function,
is
V P = V c1 − ξ
T
1 E
T
1 . (14)
2.3 Networked Evolutionary Games
Definition 12 [7] A networked evolutionary game
(NEG), denoted by Γ = {(N,E), G,Π}, consists of
(i) a network graph (N,E);
(ii) a fundamental network game (FNG), G, such that
if (i, j) ∈ E, then i and j play FNG with strategies
ai(t) and aj(t) respectively;
(iii) a local information based strategy updating rule
(SUR), Π.
AMarkov-type strategy profile dynamics of an NEG can
be expressed as


a1(t+ 1) = f1(a1(t), · · · , an(t))
a2(t+ 1) = f2(a1(t), · · · , an(t))
...
an(t+ 1) = fn(a1(t), · · · , an(t)),
(15)
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where ai(t) ∈ Dki , i = 1, · · · , n.
Using vector form expression of the strategies, (15) can
be expressed into its algebraic state space form as
a(t+ 1) = La(t), (16)
where a(t) = ⋉ni=1ai(t), and when only pure strategies
are allowed then L ∈ Lk×k; if the mixed strategies are
allowed then L ∈ Υk×k. (k =
∏n
i=1 ki.)
The fi in (15) is determined by the SUR. In the following,
MBRA, as the only SUR used in this paper, is briefly
introduced. Denote by U(i) the neighborhood of node i.
As a convention, we assume i ∈ U(i).
Let cij be the payoff of the player i in the FNG between
i and j, then the overall payoff of player i is
ci(t) =
∑
j∈U(i)\{i}
cij , i ∈ N. (17)
Assume the SUR used is MBRA, that is
ai(t+ 1) ∈ argmaxai∈Si(ci(ai, a−i(t)) := BRi(t), (18)
where the elements of BRi(t) are named as
BRi(t) :=
{
ai1, a
i
2, · · · , a
i
µi(t)
}
.
ai(t+ 1) is precisely defined as follows:
• If ai(t) ∈ BRi(t), then
ai(t+ 1) = ai(t);
• If ai(t) 6∈ BRi(t), then
ai(t+ 1) = a
i
j , with probability
1
µi(t)
,
j = 1, · · · , µi(t).
If only the local information is allowed to use, then (16)
becomes
ai(t+ 1) ∈ argmaxai∈U(i) ci(ai, aU(i)\{i}(t)), (19)
and the rest determining process remains unchanged.
Remark 13 If only the local information is allowed to
use, the convergence described in Theorem 10 is not as-
sured, unless the utilities are themselves local informa-
tion depending. That is why we need to design the local
information depending utilities.
3 Utility Design
As pointed in [10] or [14], in general, a multi-agent sys-
tem may not originally a networked evolutionary game.
There is a system level objective function φ : S → R
that a system designer seeks to maximize. Then we may
design a set of suitable utility functions such that the
system becomes a potential game with φ as its poten-
tial function. This is the first task in game theoretic ap-
proach, which is described in top part of Fig. 1. Second
task is: since the information used is a local one, a learn-
ing SUR is necessarily to assure the system converges to
the maximum object value. We start with a motivated
example.
3.1 A Motivated Example
A B C
Fig. 2. A Network
Assume there are three players:A, B, C, connected as in
Fig. 2. Assume each player has two strategiesSi = {1, 2},
i = 1, 2, 3. The system level object is to guide players
to a synchronized form a1(t) = a2(t) = a3(t) = 1. So a
system level objective function can be described as
φ(t) :=
∣∣{i ∣∣ ai(t) = 1}∣∣ .
The system designer wants to maximize φ, which leads
the system to the synchronization.
The structure vector of φ is figured out as
V φ = [3, 2, 2, 1, 2, 1, 1, 0].
Assume
c1(a) = [2, 1, 1, 0]a1a2
c2(a) = [3, 4, 2, 3, 2, 0, 1,−1]a1a2a3
c3(a) = [1, 0, 1, 0]a2a3.
(20)
It is easy to calculate that
V c1 = [2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0]
V c2 = [3, 4, 2, 3, 2, 0, 1,−1]
V c3 = [1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0].
Using (11), we have
E1 = 12 ⊗ I4
E2 = I2 ⊗ 12 ⊗ I2
E3 = I4 ⊗ 12.
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Then the potential equation (12) can be built, and a
solution is obtained as
ξ = [0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 3, 1, 0,−1, 0, 0, 1]T,
and ξ1 follows as
ξ1 = [0, 1, 0, 1]
T .
According to Theorem 11 this game is potential. More-
over, using (14) we can calculate that
V P = V c1 − ξ
T
1 E
T
1 = [2, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0,−1].
Note that
P (a) = V Pa1a2a3 = φ(a) − 1,
hence φ(a) is also a potential function.
Observing that in this networked game the utility func-
tions ci depends only on its neighborhood. Hence the
local information MBRA, as defined in (19) is the same
as the global information MBRA, as in (18). According
to Theorem 10, the local information MBRA can lead
the system to a Nash equilibrium, which maximizes the
system objective function.
Motivated by this example, it is natural to seek a set
of local information based utility functions, which then
can lead the system to a maximum point.
3.2 Local Information Based Utility Functions
Consider a game G ∈ G[n;k1,··· ,kn]. Assume U ⊂ N , say
U could be a neighborhood of a node. Then we try to
“draw” the nodes of U from all the nodes in N . We
construct a matrix, called the U -drawing matrix, to do
this. Set
ΓU := ⊗
n
i=1γi, (21)
where
γi =
{
Iki , i ∈ U
1Tki , Otherwise.
(22)
Then we have the following result.
Lemma 14 Let U ⊂ N . Then
⋉j∈Uaj = ΓU ⋉
n
i=1 ai. (23)
Remark 15 (1) The proof of Lemma 14 is based on the
fact that for two column vectors X, Y ,
X ⋉ Y = X ⊗ Y.
Then a straightforward computation leads to the
conclusion.
(2) From the proof it is clear that formula (16) is also
available for ai ∈ Υki , i = 1, · · · , n.
Consider G ∈ G[n;k1,··· ,kn] being a networked evolution-
ary game. Assume the utilities are adjustable. A natu-
ral question is: are we able to design a neighborhood-
determinant utilities such that G becomes a potential
game and local information is enough to assure the con-
vergence.
Theorem 16 Assume G ∈ G[n;k1,··· ,kn] is a utility-
adjustable networked evolutionary game. The system
objective function is
φ(a) = V φ ⋉ni=1 ai.
Then there exists a set of neighborhood-determinant util-
ities, which turn G to be a potential game, if and only if
V φ ∈
n⋂
i=1
SpanRow
[
ΓU(i)
ETi
]
. (24)
Proof. By the requirement, we have
ci(a) = V
c
i ⋉j∈U(i) aj = V
c
i ΓU(i)a, i = 1, · · · , n,
(25)
where a = ⋉ni=1ai.
Using the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 11,
one sees that G is a potential game, if and only if,
φ(a) − ci(a) = di(a−i), i = 1, · · · , n, (26)
where a−i ∈ S−i, which means di is independent of ai.
Plugging (25) into (26) yields
V φ − V ci ΓU(i) = V
d
i E
T
i , i = 1, · · · , n, (27)
which is equivalent to (24). ✷
For convenience in use, denote by B a basis of the vector
space on the right hand side of (24). That is, Row(B)
are linearly independent and
SpanRow(B) =
n⋂
i=1
SpanRow
[
ΓU(i)
ETi
]
. (28)
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3.3 Networked Potential Games
Consider an evolutionary game G = {(N,E), G,Π}, as-
sume the fundamental network gameG is potential, then
we call G a networked potential game (NPG). Assume
the system objective function
φ(a) =
∑
e∈E
Pe(a),
where Pe is the potential function for G over the edge
e. Using the natural utility function (17), it is clear that
(24) is satisfied. This fact shows that pretty of multi-
agent systems verify the requirements of Theorem ??.
In the following we give an example.
Example 17 Consider an NEG G = {(N,E) , G,Π},
where the network graph is as in Fig. 3, and the FNG,
G, is the Prisoner’s Dilemma game with payoff matrix
shown in Table 1.
1 2
3 4
Fig. 3. Network Graph, S4
Table 1
Payoff Bi-matrix of Prisoner’s Dilemma
c1\c2 1(cooperate) 2(defect)
1(cooperate) 3, 3 0, 5
2(defect) 5, 0 1, 1
Using potential equation, we can prove that Prisoner’s
Dilemma is a potential game and one of its potential
function is P (a1, a2) = [−2, 0, 0, 1]a1a2. Then the overall
potential function φ is
φ(a)
= P (a1, a2) + P (a1, a3) + P (a2, a4) + P (a3, s4)
= V P I4 ⊗ 1T4 a+ V
P I2 ⊗ 1T2 ⊗ I2 ⊗ 1
T
2 a
+V P1T2 ⊗ I2 ⊗ 1
T
2 ⊗ I2a+ V
P1T4 ⊗ I4a,
:= V φa,
where
V φ = [−8,−4,−4,−1,−4, 0,−1, 2,−4,−1, 0, 2,−1, 2, 2, 4].
According to (21) and (22), we have
ΓU(1) = I8 ⊗ 1
T
2 ; ΓU(2) = I4 ⊗ 1
T
2 ⊗ I2;
ΓU(3) = I2 ⊗ 1
T
2 ⊗ I4; ΓU(4) = 1
T
2 ⊗ I8.
Additionally,
ET1 = 1
T
2 ⊗ I8; E
T
2 = I2 ⊗ 1
T
2 ⊗ I4;
ET3 = I4 ⊗ 1
T
2 ⊗ I2; E
T
4 = I8 ⊗ 1
T
2 .
Define
Γ =


ΓU(1)
ΓU(2)
ΓU(3)
ΓU(4))

 ,B =


ET1
ET2
ET3
ET4

 .
It is easy to check that
1T4 ⊗ V
φ ∈ SpanRow
[
Γ
B
]
,
which is equivalent to (24).
4 State Based Potential Games
4.1 A Brief Review
The state based potential game is proposed in [14]. This
subsection briefly review some related basic concepts
and results.
Definition 18 (1) A finite state based evolution-
ary game is a tuple G = {N,S,C,X, P}, where
N = {1, 2, · · · , n} is the set of players; S =
∏n
i=1 Si
is the strategy profile; C = {c1, · · · , cn} is the set of
payoff (utility) functions, and ci : X×S → R; X is
the state space; P : X × S →△(X) is the the prob-
ability distributions over the finite state space X.
(2) X = {x1, · · · , xr}, where r = |X |. Similar to ai ∈
∆ki , we can also to express states in vector form as
xi ∼ δ
i
r, i = 1, · · · , r.
(3) The state x(t) satisfies
x(t+ 1) ∼ P (x(t), a(t)) , (29)
which can be expressed into its algebraic state space
form as
x(t+ 1) =MPx(t)a(t), (30)
where a(t) = ⋉ni=1ai(t).
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(4) The strategy dynamics of an evolutionary game is
of the following form


a1(t+ 1) = f1(x(t + 1), a(t), c(t))
a2(t+ 1) = f2(x(t + 1), a(t), c(t))
...
an(t+ 1) = fn(x(t + 1), a(t), c(t)),
(31)
where c(t) = (c1(t), c2(t), · · · , cn(t)). The dynamics
is determined by an SUR. In this paper we assume
fi is independent of c, hence it can be expressed in
algebraic state space form as
a(t+ 1) =MFx(t + 1)a(t). (32)
Definition 19 The action state pair [a∗, x∗] is a recur-
rent state equilibrium with respect to the state transition
process P (·) if the following two conditions are satisfied:
• The state x∗ satisfies x∗ ∈ X(a∗|x) for every state
x ∈ X(a∗|x∗).
• For every agent i ∈ N and every state x ∈ X(a∗|x∗),
ci(x, a
∗
i , a
∗
−i) ≥ ci(x, ai, a
∗
−i), ∀ai ∈ Si
Definition 20 A state based game G = {N,S,C,X, P}
is a state based potential game if there exists a potential
function φ : X × S → R that satisfies the following two
properties for every action state pair [a, x] ∈ S ×X:
• For any agent i ∈ N and action a′i ∈ Si
ci(x, a
′
i, a−i)− ci(x, a) = φ(x, a
′
i, a−i)− φ(x, a).
(33)
• For any state x′ in the support of P (x, a)
φ(x′, a) ≥ φ(x, a). (34)
The “better reply with inertia” dynamics is important
for state based games. Define an agent’s strict better
reply set for any action state pair [a, x] ∈ S ×X as
Bi(x, a) :=
{
a′i ∈ Si
∣∣ ci(x, a′i, a−i) > ci(x, a)} .
The better reply with inertia dynamics can be described
as follows.
• If Bi(x(t), a(t− 1)) = ∅ then
p
ai(t−1)
i = 1. (35)
• Otherwise, if Bi(x(t), a(t− 1)) 6= ∅ then


paii = ǫ, ai = ai(t− 1)
p
a′i
i =
(1−ǫ)
|Bi(x(t),a(t−1))|
, a′i ∈ Bi(x(t), a(t− 1))
p
a′′i
i = 0, Otherwise,
(36)
where ǫ ∈ (0, 1) is referred to as the agent’s inertia.
Theorem 21 Let G = {N,S,C,X, P} be a state based
potential game with potential function φ : X×S → R. If
all agents adhere to the better reply with inertia dynamics
then the action state pair converges almost surely to an
action invariant set of recurrent state equilibria.
4.2 State-depending Utility Design
Assume a state based multi-agent system is described
as Γ = {N,S, c,X, P}, where N = {1, · · · , n}; S =∏n
i=1 Si and Si = {1, · · · , ki}, i = 1, · · · , n; ci : X×S →
R; P : X × S → X ; X = {x1, · · · , xr}; and the system
level object is a state-depending function φ = φ(x, a).
The system objective function can be expressed as
φ(x, a) = V φxa, (37)
where a = ⋉ni=1ai, V
φ ∈ Rrk, k =
∏n
i=1 ki.
Split V φ into r equal blocks as
V φ = [V φ1 , V
φ
2 , · · · , V
φ
r ].
Assume x = xi is fixed. Then the structure vector of
φ(xi, ·) is
V φ(xi,·) = V φi , 1 ≤ i ≤ r.
Corresponding to φ(xi, ·), we can constructBi as in (28),
that is
SpanRow(Bi) =
n⋂
j=1
SpanRow
[
ΓUi(j)
ETj
]
,
where U i(j) is the neighborhood of player j under fixed
state x = xi. Define
B := diag(B1, B2, · · · , Br). (38)
Next, we need to design the state evolutionary process
(SEP). We suggest the following two ways to construct
it.
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• SEP-1 (Remaining Priority):
Construct
BR(x(t), a(t)) :=
{
xj
∣∣ φ(xj , a(t)) > φ(x(t), a(t))} .
Then
· if BR(x(t), a(t)) = ∅, then
x(t + 1) = x(t); (39)
· if BR(x(t), a(t)) 6= ∅, then
x(t+ 1) = xj , with probability pj =
1
|BR(x(t),a(t))|
xj ∈ BR(x(t), a(t)).
(40)
• SEP-2 (Equal Probability):
BR(x(t), a(t)) :=
{
xj
∣∣ φ(xj , a(t)) ≥ φ(x(t), a(t))} .
Then
x(t+ 1) = xj ,with probability pj =
1
|BR(x(t),a(t))|
xj ∈ BR(x(t), a(t)).
(41)
By the above construction it is clear that
Lemma 22 Both the SEP-1 determined by (39)-(40)
and the SEP-2 determined by (41) assure (34).
Similar to Theorem 16, we have the following result:
Theorem 23 Assume Γ = {N,S, c,X, P} is a state
based utility-adjustable networked evolutionary game.
The system objective function is
φ(x, a) = V φx⋉ni=1 ai.
Then there exists a set of neighborhood-determinant state
based utilities, which turn Γ to be a state based potential
game, if and only if
V φ ∈ SpanRowB. (42)
Remark 24 Using the SEP-1 determined by (39)-(40)
or the SEP-2 determined by (41) and the system objective
function satisfying (42), we can convert a multi-agent
system to a state based potential game. Then using better
reply with inertia dynamics, the system will converge al-
most surely to an action invariant set of recurrent state
equilibria.
1
2
3
4u
Fig. 4. Network Graph of MAS in Example 25
4.3 An Illustrative Example
Example 25 Consider a consensus problem of a multi-
agent system with its network graph depicted in Fig. 4.
There are 4 agents, N = {1, 2, 3, 4} with a common ac-
tion set Si = {1, 2}, i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Assume all players
can only communicate with their neighbors. Additionally,
there is a switch, denoted by u, which can link agent 1
with 2, or agent 1 with 3, or neither of them. The system
objective function is
φ(u, a) = 2
∑
i∈N
1{ai=1} +
∑
(i,j)∈E(u)
1{ai=aj}
2
. (43)
Define the state set X = {x1, x2, x3}, where x1 means
the switch u is open; x2 means the switch u is connected
with node 3; x3 means the switch u is connected with node
2. Then there are 3 states shown in Fig. 5.
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
x1 x2
x3
Fig. 5. Three states of the MAS
Then we have
φ(xi, a) = V
φ(xi,·)a, (44)
where
V φ(x1,·) = [11, 7, 7, 5, 8, 4, 6, 4, 8, 6, 4, 4, 5, 3, 3, 3],
V φ(x2,·) = [12, 8, 7, 5, 9, 5, 6, 4, 8, 6, 5, 5, 5, 3, 4, 4],
V φ(x3,·) = [12, 8, 8, 6, 8, 4, 6, 4, 8, 6, 4, 4, 6, 4, 4, 4].
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Next, we design the SEP. Assume we use the SEP-2,
then according to (41), we can design the state transition
function as
V P (x1,·) =


1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3

 ,
V P (x2,·) =


0 0 13
1
3 0 0
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3 0 0
1
3
1
3 0 0
1
2
1
2
1
3
1
3 1 1
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3 1 1
1
3
1
3
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
3
1
3 0 0
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3 0 0
1
3
1
3
1
2
1
2

 ,
V P (x3,·) =


0 0 0 0 13
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3 0 0 0 0
1
2
1
2 0 0
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3 0 0
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2 1 1
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
3 1 1
1
2
1
2

 .
Then we construct
[
Γxi
Bxi
]
, i = 1, 2, 3.
Note that Bxi = B, which is the same as the one in
Example 17. In addition, it is easy to calculate that
Γx1 =


I2 ⊗ 1T4 ⊗ I2
1T2 ⊗ I4 ⊗ 1
T
2
1T2 ⊗ I8
I2 ⊗ 1T2 ⊗ I4

 ,
Γx2 =


I2 ⊗ 1T2 ⊗ I4
1T2 ⊗ I4 ⊗ 1
T
2
I16
I2 ⊗ 1T2 ⊗ I4

 ,
Γx3 =


I4 ⊗ 1T2 ⊗ I2
I8 ⊗ 1T2
1T2 ⊗ I8
I2 ⊗ 1T2 ⊗ I4

 .
Using them, it is ready to verify that
1T4 ⊗ V
φ(xi,·) ∈ SpanRow
[
Γxi
Bxi
]
, i = 1, 2, 3. (45)
It is easy to prove that (45) is equivalent to (42). Accord-
ing to Theorem 23, there exists a state based potential
game G with a set of neighborhood-determinant utilities
and the φ(x, a) in (43) as its potential function.
A group of utilities functions are given bellow.
ci(x, a) = 2 ∗ 1{ai=1} +
∑
j∈Ux(i)
1{aj=ai},
x ∈ X, a ∈ S, i = 1, · · · , 4.
(46)
Using the state transition function P (x, a), we have the
state dynamic equation
x(t+ 1) =MPx(t)a(t), (47)
where
MP = [V
P (x1,·), V P (x2,·), V P (x3,·)].
Using better reply with inertia dynamics and let ǫ = 0.1,
then we have the strategy dynamic equation
a(t+ 1) =MFx(t+ 1)a(t), (48)
where
MF =


1 0.9 0.9 0.81 . . . 0 0
0 0.1 0 0.09 . . . 0 0
0 0 0.1 0.09 . . . 0 0
0 0 0 0.01 . . . 0 0
...
0 0 0 0 . . . 0.09 0
0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0
0 0 0 0 . . . 0.01 0
0 0 0 0 . . . 0 1


∈M 16×48.
Finally, we can prove that [a∗, x∗] is the only recur-
rent state equilibrium, where a∗ = (1, 1, 1, 1) and x∗ ∈
{x2, x3}. Then Theorem 21 assures that when the bet-
ter reply with inertia dynamics is used, the action state
pair converges almost surely to this [a∗, x∗]. Note that a∗
is unique and x∗ ∈ {x2, x3} is an invariant set. Fig. 6
presents several simulations of the better reply inertia on
the consensus problem of multi agent system. We can see
that the action of all the four agents will reach the con-
sensus a∗ = (1, 1, 1, 1), which maximizes the objective
function (43) of the MAS.
5 Conclusion
This paper considers the problem of game theoretic con-
trol of multi-agent systems. Assume there is a system
level objective function, say consensus, then we may de-
sign a local information based utility functions such that
the multi-agent system becomes a potential game with
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Fig. 6. The dynamics of states and strategies in 35 times
iterations initialled with [(1, 1, 1, 2), x3], [(1, 2, 2, 2), x2] and
[(2, 1, 2, 1), x1]. Note that the better reply with inertia dy-
namic guarantees convergence to a∗ = (1, 1, 1, 1).
the system level objective function as the potential func-
tion. Then individual agents can use their local informa-
tion to reach an equilibrium, which maximizes the objec-
tive function. Two cases have been investigated. (i) fixed
topology, and (ii) time-varying topology. Necessary and
sufficient conditions have been obtained for both cases.
Some examples are presented to illustrate the theoreti-
cal results.
There are several problems remaining for further study.
For example,
(1) The state transition process used in this paper for
time-varying topology is designable. A challenge
problem for further investigation is to relax this.
(2) When the necessary and sufficient condition fails,
can we design a near-potential game [22] to reach
the same goal?
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